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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2008 will represent a critical point in the history of fair housing in the
United States. Unfai r lending practices and unsustainable loans have released a
torrent of foreclosures across the nation, hanning our neighborhoods, crippling our
national housing market and weakening both the national and international
economy. 1 Unequal access to fair housing and more imp01tantly, fair credit, sits at
the core of our current global econom ic crisis. 2 We not only have a duel housing
market but also a dual credit market. 3 As we begin to pull back the layers of
complexity around the housing and credit cris is. we see that the history of racial
discrimination, redlining, a new global market with inadequate oversight and poor
enforcement of existing housing laws all contributed to our current crisis. What is
often not addressed in our eva luation of this crisis is why the overrepresentation
subprime or predatory loans (and foreclosures) occurred in Black and Latino
communities. When this is discussed. the popular yet inaccurate narrative is that
those people took out loans they knew they could not afford and banks were forced
to loan to them because of the Community Reinvestment Act.~ This inaccurate but
popular narrative suggests that effons to loan to these communities of color lie at the
heart of our global crisis. This story or narrative is not just incomplete but is
factually wrong; in fact, this narrative can lead to dangerous assumptions which
could undermine fair housing. The lesson that is likely learned from such a story is
to not loan or invest in these historically redlined communities, but instead to tightly
lock them out of the credit market. 5 These communities that were historically left
1

See CHRIS PETERSO
THE
N,
TilE KIRWAN
.
lNST FOR
STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY,
SUUPRIME
DI
L EN NG, fORECLOSURE AND RACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OFE I (2008),
SECURI11ZATION IN R£SIOF.NTIAL MORTGAGE fiNANC
http://4909e99d35cada63e7f
75747 1b7243be73e53e 14.gripelements.com/pdt:<;
/Peterson
_Securitization_Primer.pd f.
1

.1uliana Babassa, Report: Minorifies Hit by Foreclosures, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.cornlmoney/econo
/housing/2008-03
my
-06-minori ty-foreclose_N .htm.
3

See CHRISTY ROGERS, E
TH R KIRWAN
l
NST. FO THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY,
SuBPRIME LOANS, FoRECLOSURE AND THE CREDIT CRISIS: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY?- A
PRJ MER 4 (2008). http://4909e99d35cada63c7t75747 I b7243be73e53e I4.gripelements.com/
pub! ications/foreclosurc- and _race_primer_dec-2008.pd r
4

The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2005), intended to meet
the depository needs of the communities, including low and moderate income communities, in
which they operated. The Federal Reserve Board, Community Reinvestment Act,
hnp://www.fcderahescrve.gov/dcca/cra (last visited Mar. 27. 2009).
>Redlining is detined as ·'credit discrimination hy a financial institution that refuses to
make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY !283
(7th ed. 1999).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/4

2

2009)

FAIR HOUSiNG IN OHIO

211

out of the exploding new housing and credit market in the '40s, '50s and '60s may
once again lose ground to the white community in terms of both home ownership
and wealth, and be lockl!d out of the housing market again as we recov~r from this
recent crisis.
The tremendous damage inflicted on our communities of color from this
challenge represents a true crisis facing these communities and our nation. It also
demonstrates the deep interconnection between these marginalized communities and
our entire global system. But crisis represents more than just peril-it also
represents a turning point, or "an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which
a decisive change is impending."" The current housing crisis has already spurred
perilous conditions and uncertainty, but also new actions and possibilities. in order
to benefit from the opportunity, we must have an approach that understands the
forec losure issue as a credit issue. We must aggressively and affirmatively pursue
fair and opportunity based housing, and we must more adequately understand the
role of race.
A monumental event in our nation's history occurred on January 20, 2009-the
inauguration of President Barack Obama, our nation's first Afrkan American
president. 7 This tremendous achievement presents another critical, yet broad, tuming
point in our nation's engagement with racial justice, not just in terms of fair housing,
but in how we view race and integration in our society. This accomplishment
produces both risks and opportunities for those concemed with racial justice and fair
housing. President Obama and his administration may lead a new era with policies
supporting racial equity, integration with opportunity and a sustained commitment to
community development.
However, these positive implications are offset by a national dialogue which may
undermine our commitment to racial justice.~ Many pundits are asking if President
Obama's election indicates that we are in a "post-racial" America, where race
doesn't represent a significant barrier to opportunity.Q This viewpoint presents just
another iteration of the "colorblind" approach to dealing with race in our society.
We strongly disagree with this view, and lind this argument flawed and uninformed
by the systemic barriers to opportunity facing most people of color in our society.
We fear that this flawed discussion has serious implications fo r how our nation views
the need to continue to pursue the goals of racial justice. such as fair housing.
This turning point in our history will eventually yield new opportunities to
address our nation 's fair housing and credit challenges and our potemial for
advancing racial equity. For better or worse, our housing and credit system in the
U.S. will be permanently altered and translonned. As ~air housing advocates,
scholars and researchers we must ask if these changes will promote or suppress fair

6 Merriam-Webster Online Dictit>nary, http://www .merriam-webstcr.com/dictionary/crisis
(last visited Mar. 11. 2009).

7Carl Hulse, Obama Is Sworn in as 44th President, Trll· N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 20, 2009,
http://www. n ytimes.com/2009/0 J/21 //us
pol itics/20web-i naug2.html.

REIlis Cose. Revisiting "The Rage <!(a Privileged C/as.\ ... Nr.wSWEEK. feb. 2. 2009.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 18J 272.
QShelby Steele, Ohama 's Post-Racial Promise. L.l\. TIM F.S, Nov. 5. zoog,
http://www .Ia ti mes.com/ncwslop in ion tcommentary/ la-oe-stee le5- 2008nov05, 0,65 53798.story.
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housing, racial justice and true integration with opportunity. The larger fair housing
community must be at the forefront of these changes, affirmatively pushing to assure
that the restructuring of housing linance and credit options benetits those
communities of color most marginalized by our current structural and institutional
arrangements.
We a lso must communicate our perspective on race into the national dialogue
spun·ed by the election of President Obama. The fair housing community must
ensure that our goals are not lost in this new ·•post-racial" rhetoric. 10 When we look
at the structure of lending and housing, we see a system where race is extremely
important. The comfortable claim that people self-segregate is belied by these
practices. We find many of the conditions that perpetuate and maintain segregation
from opportunity, including credit, not just in the conscious animus of individuals,
but deeply embedded in our institutional practices as well as our unconscious
attitudes. Before our nation can claim to be post-racial, we must first acknowledge
and confront the systemic layers of disadvantage facing people of color.
Fair housing and true integration with opportunity is the key to dismantling these
discriminatory structural atTangements. As fair housing advocates, we must be sure
that the public is aware of these dynamics and we must continue to demand
accountability from our institutions. Title VII I gives us a handle to begin to address
some of these issues. 11 It reaches discriminatory ~::ffect and is not just limited to
discriminatory intent- its call lor affirmati'vely pursuing to the goals or fair housing,
produces the potential to create a proactive role for government to produce fair
housing.' !
The tollowing paper provides an assessment of the current housing and credit
crisis from a racial justice lens. The paper explores how race was interwoven into
the current crisis and demonstrates the racia lized impacts of the housing and credit
crisis. u We also explore some of the current challenges racing fair housing in our
society, presenting concepts and models of reform to promote true integration with
opportunity. 14 We close with a new paradigm lor addressing fair housing in the
future and utiliz ing the opportunities presented by this crisis to produce a fair
housing opportunity and a just society for all. 15

10

john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism. 86 DENV. U . L R.f.V.
(forthcoming 2009), a1·uilable at http://4909e99d35cada6Je7 t7574 71 b 7243be73e53e 14.
gripelemenls.com/ publicat ions/post-racial ism _or_ targcted_universalism _powell_ l'eb2009 .pdf.
Titlc VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (i.e., the Fair Housing A~:t) prohibits
discrimination in the sale. rental and linancing of dwellings based on race, color, religion, sex
or nationa l origin. Fair Housing and Equa l Opportunity Programs. http://www.hud.gov/
ollices/lheo/progdes
d litleX.cfm (last visited
March 27. 2009).
11

~See Hanson v. Veteran~ 1\dmin., ~00 F.2d 1381, 1386 ( 1986) ("showing or a significant
discriminatory ~::fti!ct'. ~::stab l i s h~s violation of Title VIII).
1

"s. . e infi·a Pan II.
14
See i1!lra Part II L
1

\ ) c:c: il!fi"a PurtiV.
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AND

GLOBAL SYSTEMS OF MARGI ALIZATION

The housing and credit crisis presents a dilrieuh racial equity challenge tor the
traditional advocacy community to tackle. In our global economy. advocates are
directly conti·onted by a tnte systemic global challenge which produces disparate
local outcomes. The media often represents th is challenge as a case of Wall Street v.
Main Street. 16 In reality. the global scope of this crisis stretches beyond Wall Street.
touching financial centers and nations across the globe, from Europe to Asia. 17 The
crisis does not represent just one or two bad actors, but a system that is poorly
structured and inadequately regulated .18 Our failure to understand this crisis as a
systems breakdown, and not just an individual moral breakdown, is critical to
understanding the challenges in existing pol icy reforms to stem the crisis. Do we
assign blame to people or the system? Do we redesign policies to make people
behave differently or do we restructure the system to produce better outcomes?'''
Unfortunately, many efforts to understand and respond to this crisis ignore this
global aspect of the challenge. We must not view this crisis as singular. but
understand that in our ever more interconnected world and global economy, these
systemic global challenges will continue to arise as sockties and economics around
the world become more tightly interwoven.
A. Securiti::.ation. Deregulation. and the Credit Crisis

The origins of the housing and credit crisis extend well beyond the behavior of
borrowers and lenders. The introduction of credit securiti~a t ion (and an associated
deregulation or linancial services) was critical to the growth of the subprime industry
and arc at the root of the current credit crisis. ~(t As described by Chris Peterson at the
1

''Se<' i'\ina Easton. Main Street Tums Against Wall Street. FORl UNF., Sept. 2R. 2008.
111
cnn .com/2008
/09/ 2
6/ ncws/economy /easton_ back lash. lbrtu ne/index. htm;
Mark.
tp ://money.
·wall Slreet,
CIIIOSTIAN SC.'IEN<:E M ONITOR,
Trumbull. Credit Cri~·is Hu.,· Main So·ecl Wa1clting
Aug. 13. 2007. http ://www.csmonitor.~om/2007/081 J/pOI sO 1-usec.html.
11

1:3cth 1\ nn Bovino, The (j/obal Economr: Slmng 1/('(u/H•inds for Europe and Asiu,
Mar. II, 2009. http://ww\\'.husincsswcck.com/invcstor/content/mar2009/
_null.
pi2009031 () 6 125lJ3.htm'!tampaign_id=r!>s,
lltJ'>INI:S\
WEL'K,

1
~'11< 1' 1::; ,, MAR I'IN & CAITLIN WATT, Till: K IRWAN I N~
I , I OR 'l'llb S l'lli>Y OF RACE &
F. riiN I<'II Y.St. •: BPRIMt· CRISIS A CoMPRt::IIF.NSIVF ANAl vs1s moM ,, Svs n:Ms T HINKIN<i
P~RSI'I:t' t IV F. (2008), htlp://4909e99dJ5cada63c7 1757471 b7243hc73c53e 14. gripelem~.:nts.com/
puhlicminns/Subprimc Crisis_Analysis_From Systems_ Thinking Pcrspective_Aug2008.pdf.

11
' Wc

arc not ussening a mutually cxclusivc binary between people's moral behavior and
thc functioning of systems. But our popular narrative overl y locuses on '·bad actors."-either
in minority communitit:s or on Wall Street. This is a simplistic narrative which leads to a
gros~ misunderstanding of the problem and solution. We have incentive strth.:turcl' that help
\hape action on I he pan of in\'e~tors. hut our current laws and regul.ll ion, arL' dt·~igm·d li>r an
anti4uated
''' o pany system in the changing glnhal
·l
credit marh
\\ c al't' ha' c (lllr
di-;cu~sion that action around the credit markc[ i' largely sealcd oil' from a discussion of
lbrcdosure and the needs ofminorit) communities in the United Slates. These non-connected
and individualistic polic) responses "ill not be an cffccth c approach to remedy a housing and
credit :.ystcm which is stnu;tured poorly.
~0 RoG~RS. supra note 3. at 6-7.
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University or Utah Law School, securitization was critical to the development of
modern capital markets:
In recent years, Wall Street financiers opened up a new frontier of home
mortgage lending to Americans of relatively modest means with minimal
down payments and through exotic, untested financial products. Capital
markets largely funded this new breed of aggressive subprime mortgage
finance through "securitization"- the process of bundling assets, such as
mortgage loans, into large pools and then reselling those assets as
securities to investors. Financiers justified this new private "subprime"
home mortgage market to leaders and to the American people with a
promise of new opportunities for home ownership. Today, the course of
events has proven this promise to be, at least for the time being, empty. 21
The first use of securitization by Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac provided a model
which the private sector found enticing, with Bank of America and Salomon
Brothers initiating the first mortgage backed securities in the late 1970s.12
Additional congressional acts, such as the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act of 1984, encouraged the growth of securitization by reducing legal barriers to
mortgage securitization. 23 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 and Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act helped set the
stage for the growth of the subprime industry by easing restrictions on mortgage
interest rates and preempting state regulations on non-traditional mortgages. 24 The
growth of private sector mortgage securitization spread financial risk and created a
new pool for global investment, further fue ling the availability of subprime
mortgages. 25
With the expansion of the global economy and a growing pool of global
investment capital, mortgage securities became a popular investment: private
mortgage securities doubled between 1994 and 1998. 26 But the financial industry
needed new markets to invest in and needed c-ontinued mortgage loan growth to
support the global demand for mortgage securities.27 Subprime loans and other nontraditional mortgages extended loans under unusual terms to many new borrowers,
who may not have qualified for traditional mortgages. 28 As the subprime market
tlourished, lenders and brokers became less risk adverse and reckless, with more and
more borrowers directed toward subprime products. 29 They were also able to shift
21

PETERSON,

supra note I, at I.

22

/d. at 8.

23

/d. at 8, n.77.

2

~MARTIN &

WATT,

supra note 18, at 2.

5

~ ROG ERS, supra note 3, at 6-7.
26

PETERSON,

supra note I, at 12, n. I l R.

27

See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Lenders Try
Suhprime Loans, N.Y. TIM ES, Apr. 4, 2001, at Cl.

10

Fend Ojf Laws on

~8See id

~ 9See Max Fraser, The Housing Folds: The Housing Markel and Irrational Exuberance,
TH E

NATION, Nov. 25 , 2008. http://www.thenation .com/cloc/200812!5/fraser; Associated
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more risk to the borrower.30 Because many of these loans were held for short periods
of time, lenders were less concerned aibout their worthiness. 31 Brokers were
incentivized to generate as many loans as possible as their commission was
dependent on the number of loans they originated and not long tenn loan
performance.32 As a result of these complex changes in the regulatory environment
and global financial markets, the mortgage industry changed (see Figure 1 at
Appendix). 33 Lenders were bundling and selling loans and were not as concerned
with the long term sustainability of the loan. 34 As explained by Kevin Phillips:
[Mortgage backed securities] were sectoral growth hormones as wen as
profit makers. Instead of being kept on finn ledgers, mortgage loans
could be stripped of risk by derivative contract, or in most circumstances
sold off in a mortgage backed security or structured COO. The money
received could be used for another loan or mortgage, then again-and
again. Lending limitations became non limitations. However, as volume
swelled, loan and mortgage making standards dropped. Enticements to
sign up marginal borrowers-through the "exotic" forms of mortgages
little used before-took on an ever larger role.3s
With risk spread throughout various mortgage securities, unsustainable loan
originations became a powerful profit generating mechanism in the industry. 36
Brokers responded to the "yield spread premium" they were awarded for issuing
subprime loans, further incentivizing the growth of the subprime market. 37
Unfortunately, regulatory systems did not necessarily adjust to the changing
Press, Brakers. Bankers Play Subprime Blame Game, MSNBC, May 22, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 8804054/.
30

See Fraser, supra note 29.

) lid.

32

See Brokers, supra note 29.

33See irrfra app. Fig. I. Our housing market has gone from a two or three party system to a
very complicated system that very few people understand. Our laws, regulation and oversight
are based on this three party system. A graph of this two and three party system was created
by the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity, a multiparty system figure created
by Chris Peterson at the University of Utah. The figure was adapted from a presentation
delivered at the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity National Convening on
Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and Race, October 2-3, 2008 (available at
http://www. kirwaninstitute.orglevents/archi ve/subprime-conveninglagenda.php ).
34

See PETERSON, supra note I, at 12, n.ll8.

35KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS, FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL
CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 104 (2008).
36See David Olinger & Aldo Svaldi, Examining the Subprime-Lending Crisis, THE
DENVER POST, Dec. 2, 2007, http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_7612850 ("One-hundred
eighty-two billion or more in profit was shared by brokers, lenders and investment banks.").
37JAMES LARDNER, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: ADDRESSING THE CURRENT
CRJSIS AND AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 9 (2008), http://www.demos.org/
pubs/housingpaper_6_24_08.pdf.
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marketplace. 3s But as the amount of credit in the world grew, it continued to search
out new markets. 39 The teds encouraged looking to the housing market and not at
the treasury. 40 The most undeveloped housing markets in the United States were in
the Black and Latino communities, markets that were still experiencing the effects of
redlining-reverberations from policies in place d!ecades before.~' The securitization
of the m011gage market created a constant desire for new loan o riginations, pushing
bankers and brokers to make more loans and originate loans faster. 42 The subprime
and Alt-A market became the ideal product targeted to untapped lending markets. 4J
The subprime market grew from $150 billion in 1998 to more than $625 billion by
2005. 44 Similar growth was seen in the Alt-A loan market, which grew by 660% in
fi ve years, from $60 billion in 2001 to $400 billion in 2006. 45
Many communities of color provided the untapped markets for these subprime
Joans. 46 Lender behavior grew more reckless, with a surge in hybrid option ARM
subprime loans making up 80% of the subprime market in 2005 and 2006.H There
was an assumption that housing prices could continue to rise. 48 Even if an individual
could not pay, the underlying value of the proper1y would protect the investor and
the investment pool. 49 This was not just an assumption by lenders; it was also shared
by Alan Greenspan. 50 As new institutions and brokers got into the housing credit
market, there were few regulations in these uncha•·ted waters.~' There were a number

38

/d at 5 ("regulatory bodies favored the short-term interests of bankers and lenders over
the public interest").
39

Id. at 9.

40

See Brokers, supra note 29.

41

See LARDNER, supra note 3 7. at 8, 15-1 (,.

42

ld. at 20.

43

Basical\y, Alt-A loans are considered riskier than A-pape r. or ·'prime." and less risk y
than "subprime,'' the riskil·~t catt:gMy.
4

~1RA GOLDSTEIN &

DAN UREVK'K - AO:F.l
.SBEIW,
'

RACE AND ETHNICITY, SUIIPRIMF. LI:NDING,
H AVE WE COME AND HOW FAR H AVf \V
F

Till KtRWAN

l~ST. ~OR THE

STUDY Of

Mtm f(iA(iE rORI:CLOS URES ;,:..:n RACE: HOW FAR
10

Go" 5

(.200X).

175747 1b7243be73e53e
paper.
14 .gripelcments.comtpdfs;goldstl:!in _tr(

http:/14009c99d35cada63c7
pdf.

4S /d.

46

AMAAD RIVERA ET At.. . UNil ED FOR A f .\11< ECONOMY, FOKH LOSF.D:

DREAM 2008
47

STATI~

01· T HE

(2008), http://www. fairecoawmy.org/ tiles/ St:.lleOfDrcam_ 0 1_ _16_ 0R Web.pd[

LARDNER, supra not~ 37, at 7.

48

See Brucl! Bartlett. J:flho Saw tltt> Ht>u;:,in?. Rt1bble
tng.
http://www.forbes.com.' 2008/ 12 31

Jan. 2, /200<),
hous
-tmbb lc-cr:lsh-oped
-ex_ hb_ 0 I 0-:!bart lett.html.

C'!>llllll_':::'. FORB ES.

49

See id.

sold.
51

See Anthony Faiola ct a l., Whut 1-fcnt Wrong. THE W .•.SH. PoST, Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www. washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/contcnt/article/2008/ I 01141 AR2008l 0 l4tl334J _ p[
html.
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of wrong assumptions. One was that the market would regulate itself.52 Another
was that there would not be a housing bubble nationwide. 53 We were using the
equity and growth in housing in pan to make up for the stagnant wage structure that
existed since 1973. '~ Inevitably, risky loans began to go into default. 55 Foreclosure
growth choked the hous ing market, suppressed home values, devalued securities and
set off shock waves throughout the national and global economies. 56 The systemic
and reinforcing nature of this widening crisis was described by the think tank Demos
in their report. Beyond rhe Mortgage Meltdown:
As prices fall, household wealth erodes. consumers spend less, businesses
cut back, jobs disappear, and still more people have trouble making
mortgage payments. These are the pathways that led from last year's
mortgage crisis to this year's looming recession. They could be carrying
us toward someth ing bigger than a recession: a mutually reinforcing
downward spiral in the housing market and broader economy.57
Their 2008 prediction was prown conect, with the fall of 2008 seeing an escalating
spiral of economic disruption. 5 ~ The foreclosure crisis decimated the perceived
wealth in the market's mortgage backed securities, exposing the financial risk and
poor health of some or our major financial institutions. Trillions in wealth
evaporated on Wall Street and some of the oldest and largest corporations in the
world have faced bankruptcy (or currently teeter on insolvency).59 As the economic
consequences of this phenomenon grows, diminished home prices and job losses will
52/d.
53See
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largely stagnant lor low and high wage workers between 1973 and 2007; whereas the real
wage trends for high wage workers during the same time has increased. /d.
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57

LARDNER, supra note 37, at 3.

58 Alexandra
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Homes Lose S2 Trillion In Value ln '08, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, http://money.
cnn.com/2008/12/ 15/real_c state/underwater_borrowers_near_12million/index. htm.
http://rnon
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'~Jonathan D. Glater, Advamages of Corporate Bankruptcy Is Dwindling, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2008, at Bl; Jessica Dickter. Personal Bankmptcies on the Rise, CNNMONEY.COM,
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Andrew Ross Sorkin,
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encourage more foreclosures, fueling and feeding the systemic crisis already
underway/'° Currently, nearly one in ten mortgage holders are either in foreclosure or
delinquent on payments.6 1 Recent U.S. Federal Reserve estimates indicate that
throughout 2009 the U.S. economy will continue to shrink, reaching a national
unemployment rate of nearly 9% by the end of2009.62 At this state only a sustained
and significant government intervention can stop the widening crisis.
This crisis clearly exposes the delicate and interconnected systems which
dominate our twenty-first century global society: systems which, for better or for
worse, link the fate of all communities, nations and people. Analyzing these
systemic connections can help us understand how poor lending practices in places
like East Cleveland can be fueled by the behavior of financial titans on Wall Street
and conversely, where escalating foreclosures in the inner city can escalate and
wreak havoc on the entire U.S. and global economies. We live in a new age, which
requires a new way of thinking, a new paradigm for understanding that we impact
the rest of the world and the world impacts us.
B. Global Systems of Marginalization and an Advocacy Response

When systems fail, marginalized communities bear the brunt of this failure.
Often, as global systems change or are reordered, marginalized communities bear the
burden of this change, while the benefits accrue to the elite.63 As global commerce
has expanded and systems around the globe have changed, inequality has grown,
primarily in nations with poor social safety nets, poor social norms and policies that
do not support full societal membership.64 Just as the globalization of industry has
spurred the growth of sweatshops in the Global South, the growth of the credit and
financial crisis disproportionately burdened our marginalized communities in the
U.S. Larger systemic challenges facing our society are often first evident in
marginalized communities or among marginalized populations. This phenomenon is
described in the Miner 's Canary by Lani Guiner and Gerald Torrez.65 If we would

60

Pallavi Gogoi et al., Bailout Plan: Foreclosure Issue Still a Major Hurdle, USA TODAY,
Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-02-l 0-bailout-details_N .htm.
61

Les Christie, 7.5 Million Homeowners "Underwater," CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 31, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/J0/30/real_estate/undetwater_borrowers/index.htm; Alan Zibel,
Record 1 in 10 Americans Are Delinquent on Mortgage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5. 20{)8.
http://www.cleveland.com/realestatenewslindex.ssf/2008/12/record I in I0
americans_are_d.html.
- - - 62

Jeannine Aversa, Economy Will Sink Further, Fed Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19.
2009, http://www.dispatch.com/live/contentlnational_world/stories/2009/02/ 19/fed_economy
_0219.ART_ART_02-19-09_AI_E4CVCS6.html?sid=l01.
63

JOHN A. POWELL & S.P. UDAYAKUMAR, RACE, POVERTY AND GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY
AND RACE, POVERTY AND RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL (2000).
64

PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF ALIBERAL l29 (2007); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, For
Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 6, at 62; Christopher Jencks, Why Do So Many Jobs Pay
So Badly?, in INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND JTS
POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES 129-131 (James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005).
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only address these systemic challenges early, we would prevent them from
expanding to our friends and neighbors. True fair housing, integration with
opportunity. and sustainable and fair credit practices would have helped us avoid
much of the global consequences of the housing and credit crisis. In respondjng to
these systemic challenges we must focus our energies on these communities most
impacted by the crisis, the communities that are disproportionately burdened by
systemic discrimination or "structural racialization.'166
The current housing and credit crisis presents a powerful case study of how
systems can produce disparate outcomes for marginalized communities. Fair
housing advocates are at the forefront of dealing with this crisis, but many are at a
loss when attempting to understand how to intervene in the complex global dynamics
which created the crisis. Actions in Congress, on Wall Street and in global tinancial
centers around the globe resulted in discriminatory lending behaviors, vacant
properties and community distress in our backyards. Although this systemic crisis
presents an unusual challenge for traditional fair housing advocates, we must not
shrink away from the challenge just because of its systemic complexity and global
reach.
Our communities are pan of the global system and vulnerable to a new set of
challenges which are dynamic and interactive. We argue that these systemic
challenges will become more frequent in the future, especially as our global world
becomes more interconnected. The broader social justice community must be
prepared to learn how to effectively intervene into these new global systemic
challenges. Be it foreclosures created by the credit crisis, job losses due to
globalization or another challenge like climate change, advocates must assure that
marginalized communities are actively involved in designing solutions to these
challenges. In the case of the housing and credit crisis, as fair housing advocates we
must not only be at the table but at the forefront as we redesign critical housing and
credit systems and institutions (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
Ill. THE RACIAL FOOTPRINT OF THE CREDIT CRISIS
There is clear and irrefutable evidence that in the case of the housing and credit
crisis, communities of color were disproportionately burdened by the crisis.6 7 Race
is a critical and salient lens to understand the current credit crisis, and the current
crisis is a significant lens to view the overall state of fair housing for communities of
color. What is less clear is why. Conservatives might argue that it is because the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) caused banks to make bad loans to
irresponsible people. 68 While there certainly were many bad loans, they were not

66
Structural racialization refers to the ways nn which the joint ()perations of institutions
produce raciaJized outcomes. JOHN A. POWELL, STRUCTURAL RACIALI
Z ATION AND IMPLICIT
C IAL COGNITIO
SO
hltp:/17 4.125.95.132/search?q=cache:vL406C8yV5cJ:4909e99d35
cada63e7f757471 b7243be73c53e 14.gripelements.com/presentations/2008_ 6_ 19_ NLADA _Pie
nary_SR_and_ IB.ppt+structural+racialization&cd=2&hl=en&cr=clnk&gl=us&client= tirefoxa.
67

N (2008),

See RIVERA, supra note 46.

68

See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges, Speech at the Washington D.C.
Community Affairs Research Conference (Mar. 30, 2007).
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caused by the CRA, but more the result of the new global credit market and the
lending frenzy it was creating. Liberals are more likely to see discrimination against
communities of color as the reason for the high foreclosure race in these
communities.6'> While this may have been a factor, in some cases there was a less
7
nefarious goal of lenders trying to tap an undercapitalized market. " This desire to
extend credit to tht:se undercapitalized markets was not only an approprialL~ goal
then- it continues to be an appropriate goal nn\\'. What was missing in this
extension of credit was an evaluation of the tenns. Credit needs to be extended to
these historically credit maligned communities, but the terms of credit need to be
sustainable and fair. Instead of oftering sustainable and fair credit, our pricing
structure for dealing with risk in underserved communities was to create exploitative
credit terms that set the borrower up for failure. 71 The following section of this paper
reviews the factors contributing the racialized impact of the credit crisis and reviews
the overall impact of this crisis to both communities of color and fair housing in our
nation. We close this section with a case study of Cleveland, one of the epicenters of
the subprime crisis, looking at the intersection of race, fair housing and the credit
crisis in Cleveland.

A. Race and the Credit Crisis: Whar the Evidence Finds
Across the nation, communities of color were heavily burdened by both
discriminatory lending and foreclosures. 7 ~ While some people should not have
gotten a loan, many received the wrong type of loan and unsustainable terms.
Nationally, estimates found that people of color were more than three times as likely
to receive a subprimc loan and approximately half of loans given to people of color
were subprime.73 Research by the Center for Responsible Lending found in 2006
that 52% of home loans for African American families were subprime; these figures
were 40% tor Latino families and 22% for White families. 74 In 2005, Federal
Reserve data found 55% of Blacks who took out mortgages received subprime
products, compared to 17% of Whites and Asians.75 Even after factoring out tor
financial differences between White and Non-White borrowers, people of color were
more than 30% more likely to receive a subprime loan. 76
6
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The footprint of these loans was not only racially disparate but also
geographically disparate, with communities of color victim to significant
concentrations of subprime and other non-traditional or predatory loan products. 77
Research by the U.S. Federal Reserve from 2004 to 2006 found that communities
with significant minority populations received large concentrations of subprime
loans.7K With a strong link between subprime or predatory loans and foreclosure,
people of color and communities of color are being devastated by the rise in
foreclosures. '" Early in the foreclosure crisis. approximately one in ten Black and
Latino borrowers were affected by foreclosure, compared to less than one in twenty
White borrowers. 80 Race and the credit crisis are tightly interwoven, with
communities of color and people of color explicitly targeted by poor lending
practices and most burdened by the escalating crisis.
B. Race and the Crisis: The Residua/Impact of History and The Ghost ofRedlining

Why were people of color and communities of color so disproportionately
impacted by the crisis? To answer this question. we must look at both the current
challenges facing communities of color and tbe residual impact of historical patterns

of disinvestment and discrimination in these communities.

Historically,

communities of color were systematicall y denit:d credit through public and pri vate
policies.81
The notorious FHA "red lining'' maps of the I 930's illustrated
government sanctioned policy to rank racially mixed or segregated communities of
color as hazardous investments and discourage financing tor these communitics.x1
This publically sanctioned disinvestment was foll owed by widespread private
disinvestment and discrimination in these communities, producing a long term era of
undercapitalization for our nation 's communities of color.R.1
This era of
undercapitali:zation was followed by a period of capitalization through discriminatory
lending products. 8~ Jesus Hernandez at the University ofCalitornia- Davis identifies
three eras of undercapitalization intlicted on communities of color.R' First, from
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1930 to 1950, publically sanctioned re<llining and restrictive covenants
undercapitalized communities or color and reinforced segregation.&6 In the second
era. from 1950 to 19RO, public policies such as urban renewal and the federal
87
highway program drove White flight. decimating assets in communities of color.
Finally. in the post-1980 "reverse redlining" era, a string of discriminatory lending
products were targeted into these historically undercapitalized and segregated
communitics.s~ Hernandez found a concentration of subprime and other high cost
loans in rhe traditionally red lined communities in California.89 In the age of reverse
redlining, credit discrimination shifted from outright denial to the emergence of a
dual credit system .~0 This dual credit system offered products for the majority at
prime rates but provided credit to marginalized borrowers at excessively high interest
rate~ and cost. ''~
After being starved of credit and investment for nearly half a century, predatory
actors intiltrated these communities with a number of predatory services, from
payday lender<: to furniture rental ~tores, from "buy here, pay here'' auto dealers to
subprime loans. Residents of these segregated communities were more likely to be
lower income or economically marginalized. placing them in a precarious financial
position, extremely sensitive to sudden losses in income or unexpected expenses.
Homeowners of color in these communities provided great targets for mortgage
brokers. 92 These homeowners had some limited home equity but were lower income:
so lenders who aggressively marketed and promised cash back via refinancing
provided an enticing offer tor those concemed with other financial troubles. This
phenomenon may help explain why half or all subprime loans were actually
refinance loansY' Due to relatively low home ownership rates and little experience
with mortgage lending, borrowers in these communities were less aware that they
were being given unusua l or high cost loan terms. 94
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Given tinancial incentives for pushing lucrative subprime products. brokers
exploited these vulnerabilities. using aggressive marketing in these communities to
lure in new borrowers and then steer inexperienced borrowers into high cost loan
products.95 By the late years of the subprime loan era, lenders were steering nearly
half of borrowers who qualifi·ed for prime credit into subprime products.96 Historical
undercapitalization created communities ripe for exploitation by unfair lending
practices; subprime loans are just a more recent and extreme manifestation of
discriminatory credit concentrated in vulnerable commun ities. 97
In the end, a perfect storm of systemic barriers to opportunity produced
widespread vulnerability in communities of color. 9 ~ As lenders looked to expand the
pool of borrowers to fuel the securitization fire that was overtaking Wall Street, these
communities provided perfect targets for non-traditional and predatory lending
products.99 As a result, communities of color became both the most exploited
population in respect to this crisis- the root of escalating foreclosures which
eventually ensnared our entire housing market and economy. 1110
C. Why Is this Crisis so Damaging to Communities (?!"Color?

Before the current housing and credit crisis, a number of fair housing challenges
degraded access to opportunity for people of color. 101 The damage infl icted upon
communities of color as a result of the credit and housing crisis will significantly
frustrate fair housing goals and exacerbate many of these existing conditions. As we
look toward the future of fair housing. we must not only take stock of the ongoing
fair housing challenges that burdened communities of color prior to the crisis, but
also assess the direct impacts of today's crisis on the lair housing challenges facing
these communities in the future.
I. Fair Housing Challenges Pre-Credit Crisis

Heightened attention has been focused on rhe fair housing implications of credit,
lending, and foreclosure in light of the credit and housing crisis. 102 This additional
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energy and attention is needed, but fair housing scholars and advocates must
continue to focus on the preexisting fair housing challenges plaguing communities of
color. Broadly speaking. although there have been some victories and progress in
the forty years after the enactment or the Fair Housing Act, our nation has still fallen
far short of meeting the goal of true fair housing and integration with opportunity for
people of color. 103 Minority suburbanization and the slow growth of minority
homeownership rates must be placed in the context of persistent racial segregation,
extremely racialized concentrated poverty, excessive housing cost burdens for people
of color and increasing rates of school segregation. 104
Consider that in 2000, nearly one in ten Blacks living in the 100 largest
metropolitan areas were living in high poverty neighborhoods. 105 Three out of four
of the three million people living in concentrated poverty in 2000 were Black or
Latino.' ~ The fact that more minorities can be found in the suburbs than the inner
city has not lessened these numbers; in fact our suburbs are now home to more
people in poverty than our cl!ntral cities. 107 Research indicates that minorities who
leave tor the suburbs are more likely to be re-concentrated in distressed suburban
communitics. 108 Integration has become more challenging as our metropolitan areas
are becoming more polarized. with middle income neighborhoods on the decline. 109
Residential rates or segregation remain high, with dissimilarity index results for our
nation's metropolitan areas remaining at .65. indicating that nearly two out of three
White or Black residents would need to relocate to produce integrated
neighborhoods. 110 White dissimilarity rates have dropped faster in smaller, less
diverse metropol itan areas; in our larger diverse metropolitan regions the decline has
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been at half the rate found in smaller less diverse areas.'' ' Despite changes in our
metropolitan landscape in the forty years since the enactment of the Fair Housing
Act, residential segregation- most notably for African Americans- remains
persistent, and true integration into communities or opportunity for most people of
color remains an elusive goal.
A complex web of factors contributes to persistent denial of fair housing and
integration with opportunity for communities of color. 11 ! These dynamic, persistent
and reinforcing challenges existed betore the current credit and housing crisis and
will continue to persist after the crisis. First, we must remember that the housing
market serves people or color poorly; our market rarely builds and provides housing
at prices which meet the income conditions found in the Black and Latino
communities. Even before addressing the policy and persona l contributors to denial
of housing opportunity, we must be clear that our current housing system is failing
most people of color. For example, our research here in Franklin County, OH (home
county to Columbus) found that in the early part of the past decade. more than 90%
of all new single family homes were unaf1ordable to the median income Black and
Latino family in the region.".l In 2000. more than 40% of African American
households in the State of Ohio had "housing problems" related to affordability.
crowding, or substandard housing. 11 " Similar conditions can be found in housing
markets throughout the nation.
Personal and institutional discrimination in the housing market continues.tt~
Steering and "editorializing" by realtors reinforces patterns of residential
segregation, while outright discrimination in the market has declined but is still
problematic. 116 But public policy with respect to housing, land use, zoning,
development and education plays a profound rok in upholding residential
segregation and denial of housing opportunity for people of color. 117
111 John
MUMFORD

Logan, Ethnic Dil·ersity Groll'!i: NeighhorhooJ
Integration Lags Behind,
CENTER

FOR COMPARATIVE

UR13AN

ANI)

RWIONAt.

ANALYSIS

Ll :WIS

(2001),

http://mumford l.dyndns.org/cen2000/report. htrnl.
112

See

BROWN

& 8 ENN1Nti1'0N, supra note I0 I.

113
a. powell & Jason Reec~. The Kirwan lnst. lur the SIUdy of Race and Ethnicity,
john
Housing Need and Opportunity in Franklin County. Ohio: An Assessment of Housing Need
and Opportunity Based Housing for Frank Iin County. Ohio (2005 ). http://4909c99
d35cada63e7f7574 71 b7243be73c53e 14.gripeil:mcnts.com/publications/BR EADHousingRepor
t.pdf.

114
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Cons('llidated Plan, CHAS 2000
Database. http://www. huduser.org/datasets/cp.html (last visited Mar. 9. 2009).

ll 5See

John Yinger. Housing Discriminmiun Is Still Worth Won:ring Ahour, 9 HOUSIN(i
893-927 ( 1998); see also The Cn:~1:s of Sl.'gregarion: 2007 Fair Housing
Report,
NATIONAl.
FAIK
HOUSING
ALLIANCE,
Apr.
30.
2007.
Trendy
www.nationalfairhousing.org.

E

POLICY DEBAT

116
George Galster & Erin Godfrey. By Words and Deed~:
Raciol Steering
Agents in the US in 2000, 7 1 .1. AM. PLANNING Ass'N 251. 253 (2005 ).

hy Real Estate

7
ll See john a. powell. Sprmrl. Fragmemation. and the Persistence of Racial Inequality:
Limiting Civil Rights l~v Fragmenting Spat'!.', in URUAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CoNSioQUEN<.:ES,
AND POLICY RESPONSES (Gegory Squires ed. 2002): john a. powell, 2002 Report of the
Citizens· Commission on Civil Rights: Rights at Risk, Equulity in e111 Age of Terrorism, in
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Although the days of explicitly sanctioned government housing discrimination
are gone, a number of facially race neutral factors produce clear racially disparate
and discriminatory outcomes for people of color. 118 Localism and exclusionary
zoning (and similar land use policies) produce severe obstacles to the development
of affordable and rental housing, which denies access to opportunity-rich
communities for most people of color. 119 Despite clear evidence of the racially
disparate outcomes of exclusionary land use policies, the courts are split as to
whether there must be intent. While Title VIII has been interpreted to not require
intent in some circuits, others have read intent into the statutes. •~o
In addition, land use policies and infrastructure policies which encourage
suburban sprawl have heighted the opportunity divide facing inner city communities
of color. 121 Court decisions which have limited the possibility of interregional school
desegregation (focusing only on intercity desegregation) have contributed to the
racial segregation in our metropolitan regions and encouraged White flight. m:
Finally, subsidized housing (which in metropolitan areas disproportionately serves
people of color) is largely concentrated in distressed and segregated
neighborhoods. 123 Although the era of traditional public housing towers is ending,
much of our nation 's subsidized housing inventory in metropolitan areas is found in
our central cities, usually in more segregated and higher poverty neighborhoodsY"
In 2000, 75% of federally subsidized housing and 59% of Low Income Housing Tax
Credit (LIHTC) units were located in central cities, while only 37% of the nation ·s
population resides in central cities.' 25
In 2000. the average metropolitan
neighborhood had a poverty rate of 13%, while the average neighborhood with
URBAN FRAGMENTATION AS A BARRIER TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2002); George Galster.
Residentictl Segregation in American Cities: .4 Contrary Review. 7 POPULATION RESEAI{CI
I
AND POLICY R EVIEW 93-1 12 ( 1988).
11

sMenendian et al., A Report to the U.N.
the Committee
EliminUiion
Ra for
uf cial
Discrimination 0f7 the Occasion of Its Review of the Periodic Report of the United States of
America (Feb. 2008). http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/terd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN2.
doc.
11

~See Pendall, Rolf. Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of £refusion, 66 J. A!\1 .
PLANNING Ass'N 125-42 (2000): powell. 2002 Repon of the Citi:ens' Commission on Ch·i!
Rights, supra note 64.
120

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.• 429 U.S. 252. 287 ( 1977). United States
v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 11 79. 1186 (8th Cir. 1975).
'"'john a. powell, Achieving Racial Justice: What's Sprmvl Gotto Do with It:'. POVERTY &
Sept.-Oct. 1999, http://www.prrac.org/full_text.pnp?text_id=292&item _id= 1841 &news
letter_ id=46& header=Search%20 Resu Its.
RACf.

12

~See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

12.1See Florence W. Roisman, Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to
End Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Eristing Housing
Programs, CtTYSCAPE. 1999, hup://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscape.html.
124

See id.

1

~ Lance Freeman, Siting Affordable Housing: Location and Neighborhood Trends of Low
Income Housing Tax Credir Development~ in the 1990s. TH E BROOKINGS INS1TftJTlON (2004).
http://www. brook i ngs.edu/urban/pubs/20040405 _Frecman.pd f.
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LIHTC units bad a poverty rate of approximately 20%.
For the average
neighborhood with other types of subsidized housing, the poverty rate v.as zq%. 121'

2. New Challenges Post-Credit Crisis
The foreclosure crisis is expanding housing pressure on tamilics of color,
creating widespread financial hardship for homeowners of color and decimating
many communities of color. Families immediately impacted by foreclosures race
great economic hardship and dislocation, and must seek new housing in a lightening
rental market. 117 Renters are also being unexpectedly displaced as inner city property
investors are allowing properties to go into default. 128 The social fabric of
neighborhoods is ripped apart when homeowners and renters are displaced and
children are forced to relocate to new schools. '~Q Communities of color, many of
which had faced a number of challenges already, such as high poverty, disinvestment
or vacant properties prior to the foreclosure epidemic, are now facing extreme
conditions. The foreclosure crisis is producing widespread vacant properties, which
act like a toxin in the urban environment, poisoning the health of the entire
community. Do The growth in vacant properties is further dragging down property
values, creating extensive blight and safety risks in communities of color and in
some cases spiraling stable neighborhoods into a permanent state of distress, as well
as undermining entire cities. 131 For people of color and others living segregated in
these neighborhoods, the crisis is creating widespread burdens. ensnaring all
residents, even those who are not facing foreclosure. m The impact of living in one
of these neighborhoods is cumulative and not adequately captured by just focll.lsing

126/d.
121

David Rothstein, Collateral Damage: Renters in the Foreclosure Crisis , PoucY
MATTERS OHIO, June 2008, http:// www.policymattersohio.org/Collatera1Damage2008.hun;
Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardip. Renters and the Housing Credir Crisis, PovERTY & RM·r
July/ Aug.
2008,
https://www2398.ssldomain.com/ nlihc/doc/ Pe lletiere-Wardrip-7 -~-OR
PRRAC.pdf; DANILO PELI.ETIERE
, RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: D EF!NIN(i TilE PRO'BI.EM.
IDENT!FYINO
SOLUTIONS, NATIONAL
COALITION LOW
INCOME HOUSING
(2009),
https:l/www2398.ssldomain.com/ nlihcldoc/renters-in-foreclosure.pd[
128

See Rothstein, supra note 127.

129

See id. at 10.

130

See David Kraut, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight o( Vanmt
Bui/dingsfrom Urban Areas, 74N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139(1999).
131See Scott Simon, In Cleveland. Foreclosures Decimate Neighborhoods. National Public
Radio (May 24. 2008), http://www .npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyld.,.907 45303;
Robert Gavin. As Foreclosures Widen, a Neighbvrhood Erodes. Crisis Tests Mam· in North
Lav•rence, TH E BosTON GLOUE, Oct. 7, 2007. ww\\>.boston.com/
http://
realestatc
/ news/articles/2007/ 10/07/ as_foreclosures_ widen_:l_neighborhood_ erodes/: Kraut. supra note
130; William Spelman. Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 4R I
( 1993); R. TAYLOR & A. HARRELL, PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND CRIME, NAIIONAL INSTrrun;
Of JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT, Jan. 1996, http: //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/physenv.pdf.

132

Kraut, supra note 130, at I 143-52.
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on the number of home in foreclosures; residents face a variety challenges outside of
housing, including education, economic health, and public health. 133

Research also finds the crisis will bave significant impacts on the racial wealth
gap in the U.S. In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau studies found the disparity between
assets held by White households and Black households to exceed 900%, thus for
every $1 held in assets for Blacks. Whites held $9 in assets. 134 Home equity is the
primary source of assets and wealth for American households, therefore disparity in
home equity is a significant contributor to the wealth gap. 135 Wealth is critical to
advancement and stability in our society and a far more important indicator of
financial well being than income. 136 Due to assets lost directly from foreclosure and
the home equity losses from surrounding foreclosures, the wealth impacts of the
crisis on people of color are predicted to be tremendous. 137 United for a Fair
Economy's 2008 study on the wealth impacts of the crisis projected a net loss of
nearly a quarter trillion dollars in assets for Black and Latino homeowners. 138 In
addition, research indicates that Black and Latino borrowers are also draining their
existing non home-based assets (e.g. savings and retirement accounts) to avoid
foreclosure. 139 This phenomenon, described as "asset stripping," is depleting the
other assets held by borrowers of color, just before they lose their home equity via
foreclosure. 140
The foreclosure crisis also could bring about a new wave of redlining or
substantially restricted credit for borrowers and communities of color. 141 As
financial attempts to stabilize and stem their exposure to future loss, credit will be
rnore difficult to obtain. 142 People of color who have been directly impacted by
IJJ /d.
134

U.S. Census Bureau, Household Economic S!Udies. Net Worrh and Asset Owne1
hip :s

1998-2000, http://www.censusbureau.biz/prod/2003pubs/p70-88.pdf (last visited Apr. 7,

2009).

135/d.
136
See DALTON CONL
EY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN TH,E RED: RACE. WEALTH, AND SOCIAl.
CY IN
POLI
AMERI
of Cal. Press 1999); see a/su MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIIW, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQ
U ALITY
(Routledge 1995 ).

CA (Univ.

13 7

Ed Cutlip, Subprime Crisis Causing Historic Wealth Loss for People of Color, MEDIA
MOUSE, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.mediamouse.org/news/2008/02/subprime-crisis.php.
13

~RIVERA, supra note 46.

139

See Hannah Thomas, Brandeis University, Panel Presentation at the Kirwan Institute for
the Study of Race and Ethnicity National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and
Race (Oct. 2. 2008) (transcript available ar http://kirwaninstitute.org/events/archive/
subpri me-convening/agenda. php ).
140

See id.

141

To live in a marginal neighborhood segregated from opportunity negatively impacts all
people including Whites living in such neighborhoods. The impact of this creates a negative
incentive to live in such neighborhoods.
142

Valeria Fernandez, Communities
http:/ /color! ines.com/article.ph p?l D=4 75.
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foreclosure will find their credit permanently marred for years. 143
Their
neighborhoods will continue to be locked in a credit system that does not serve them
well and does not lead to effective participation in the larger credit market. 144
Borrowers who have not been foreclosed upon themselves will still face a restrictive
lending environment. 145 Borrowers of color seeking to refinance are also more likely
to be impacted by declining home values and will be more prone to denial for
refinance loans. 146 Some evidence of these trends is already apparent. Nationally,
the racial divide is starting to widen in mortgage applications. with mortgage
applications down 40% for Black and Latino borrowers, compared to 19% for White
borrowers. 147 In Ohio, the racial divide in mortgage denials has grown between 2005
and 2007: in 2005. 29% of African American borrowers were denied purchase loans;
this figure was up to 36% in 2007. 148 For Black borrowers looking to refinance. 50%
were denied in 2005 compared to 60% in 2007. 1'19 An increasingly tight and
restrictive credit market will only further expand the denial of prime credit to
borrowers and communities and create further impediments to fair housing.
D. Cleveland, 01-1: A Case Study

Cleveland, like Detroit and other rust belt regions, is at the epicenter of the credit
and housing crisis. 150 As one of the most segregated metropolitan areas, Cleveland
suffers from a number of fair housing challenges which have long predated today's
housing and credit crisis. 151 With a Black/White residential dissimilarity index
143
See Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, For Minorities. Signs of Trouble in Foreclosures, THF.
NEw YORK TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage .html?res =9505E7D
D I E3EF931 A 15751 COA9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
14 4

See Simon, supra note 131 .

145

See id.

146

See Bajaj & Nixon, supra note 143 .

147

Solomon Greene. Open Society Institute, Panel Presentation at The Kirwan Institute for
the Study of Race and Ethnicity National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and
Race: Philanthropic Response to the Subprime and Foreclosure Crisis (Oct. 2, 20011)
(transcript and presentation available at http://kirwaninstitute.org/events/archive/subprimeconvening/a.genda.php) (citing forthcoming data from the Furman Center for Real E,state and
Urb(.ln Policy at NYU).
148
.JEFFREY D. DILLMAN lOT AL.. RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN OHIO MORTGAGE
LENDING, HOUSING RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CENTER (2006), http://www.thehousing
center.org/docman/Download-docu ment/15-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparities-in-Ohio-MortgageLending-2006.html; JEFFREY D. DILLMAN ET AL., PERStSTTNG RACIAL AND ETHNIC DnSPARITH;S
IN OHIO MORTGAGE LENDING, HOUSING RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CENTER (2009).
http://www. thehousingcenter.orgldocman/Download-docu ment/61-Persi sting-Racial-EthnicDisparities-in-Ohio-Mortgage-Lending -F ebmary-2009. htm I.

149/d.
150 LJSA NELSON, A LOOK BEHIND THE NUMI3ERS: FORECLOSURE fiLINGS IN CUYAHOGA
COUNTY. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK Or CLEVELAND I (20011), http://www.clc:velandfed.org/
Our_Region/Community_Development/Publications!Behind_the_Numbers/2008/0908/ALBT
N_ Vl_ll.pdf.
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ranking of .77, the Cleveland metropolitan area has the seventh highest rate of
Black/White residential segregation in the nation. 1 5~ The average African American
household in the Cleveland region lives in a neighborhood with a 24% poverty rate
in 2000, more than three times the poverty rate experienced by the average White
household's neighborhood poverty rate of 7.5%. 153 In 2000, data from HUD
indicated that nearly 40% of African Americans and 43% of Latinos living in
Cuyahoga County had housing problems (primarily due to cost), compared to 24% of
Whites. 154
These preexisting fair housing challenges have been exacerbated by
discriminatory lending and escalating foreclosures. ;ss Black and Latino borrowers in
the region are far more likely to be denied mortgage financing and retinancing. 151' In
2006, 13% of Whites were denied a home purchase loan, compared to 40% for Black
borrowers and 23% for Latinos.' 57 In 2006, more than half of Black borrowers were
denied refinancing loans. 15M African American and Latino bonowers were a lso
disproportionately burdened with high cost loans. In 2006. nearly 70% of home
purchase loans and nearly 60% of refinance loans were high cost loans; these figures
for White borrowers were 20% and 28% respectivelyYQ
Further, high cost loans were disproportionately concentrated in the city's
communities of color, primarily African American neighborhoods on Cleveland 's

152

For ranking.s and dissimilarity indices see Lewis Mumtord Center, Metropolitan Racial
and Ethnic Change - Census 2000, http://mumford.albany.edu/census/ WholePop/ WP
download.html (download data from ·'Option 2" by selecting "200o,·· "Entire metro area," and
"Dissinularity indices·') (last v isited Mar. 12. 2008).
15

>Lewis C. Mumford Center ror Comparative Urban and Regional Research at the
University of NY Albany. Measuring Neighborhood Inequity Graph. http://mumford.
albany.edu/census/SepUneq/
80msaScp.htm
PublicScpDataPagesl l6
(last visited Mar. I 2,
2008).
4

1.s SOCDS CHAS Data, Housing Problems Output for Black Non-Hispanic Households.
http://socds.huduscr.or
g/CHAS/ CHASj ava.htm
(select "Housing Problerns,"
' "Ohio.' "2000."
"Black
Non-Hispanic Households," "County,'' " Cuyahoga'') (last visited Mar. 12, 2008):
SOCDS CHAS
Data. Housing Problems Output for Hispanic Households,
' ," ··ohio.'' "2000,'
http://socds.huduscr.org/CHAS/CHASjava.htm (sekct·'Housing Problems
(last visited Mar. 12, 2008): SOCDS CHAS
"Hispanic Households;· "County.'' ··cuyahoga'")
Data,
Housing
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Output
for
White
Non-Hispanic
llouseholds.
http://socds.hudusc.;:r.org/CHAS/CHAS_java.htm (select ·'I lousing Problems," "Ohio," ·'2000,"
"White Non-Hispanic Households,"
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''County:·
(last visited Mar. 12. 2008).

155

See

JEFFREY

D.

DILLM:\N (T AI. .• THE STATf 0 1· FArR HOUSING IN NORTHEAST OHIO:

2008, HOUSING R ESEAR
CH
& ADV()("ACY
centcr.org!Publications/Rcsearch-Reports.htrnl.
APRIL

C ENT
ER

(2008). hllp:l/www.thehousing

1 6

s See id.
!d.

157

15$ /d.

IS?/d.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/4

22

2009]

FAIR HOUSING IN OHIO

23 1

East Side, where more than two out of three mortgages were high cost loans. 1w As a
result of these lending disparities, foreclosures escalated throughout the region, with
extreme concentrations of foreclosures and vacant properties in many of the region's
urban communities of color. 161 Research by the Center on Urban Poverty and
Community Development at Case Western Reserve University in 2008 found that
one-third of subprime loans made in Cuyahoga County resulted in foreclosure
(compared to a 4% default rate for prime loans) and that the top twenty subprime
loan originators in 2005 produced 82% of all foreclosures. 162 Both low and high
income Black borrowers were more likely to receive subprime loans, and 28% of all
loans made in 2005 to Black borrowers resulted in foreclosures. 163 The cost of
foreclosure is severe: a 2008 study released by Community Research Partners
estimated the financial cost to the City of C leveland as more than $35 million, due to
the city's vacant properties. 1M Residents in foreclosure stricken neighborhoods are
dealing with growing neighborhood blight, declining property values, increased
crime, vandalism, and widening neighborhood instability_l 65 Families who have been
foreclosed upon are thrust into a difficult housing market and growing financial
instability.
Fair housing advocates, local non-profits, neighborhood groups, and local
governments have made significant efforts to stem the c risis in Cleveland and
throughout Ohio.'~" But, these institutions do not have the resources to effectively
stem the extent of the crisis. Prior to the economic stimulus bill passed in February
of 2008, only $4 billion had been allocated by Congress to address the vacant
property produced by the crisis via the Neighborhood Stabilization grants, while
$700 bi llio n was given to the financial sector to stabilize lenders. 167 For example,

10
°Fl>r a map image of high interest loans in Cuyahoga County, see Tracking High-Interest
Lending. CLEVELAND.CQM NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009. http://www.cleveland.com/news/ wide/
inckx.ssf?lendingO 122.html.
16 1

Dan Harkins, Tattered; Rampant Foreclosures Have Torn the Very Fabric of the
Region, CLt.:VF.LAND SCENE, Jul y 9, 2008, http://www.freetimes.com/ stories/15/62/tattered;
Juliana Barbassa, Report: Minorities Hit by Foreclosures, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://www .usatoda y.com/money/econom y/housing/2008-03-06- m i.nori ty- foreel ose _N. htm.
162

Mark Gillispie, 84% o.f Local Foreclosures are Subprime Loans, TilE PLAINR, DEALE
June 23, 2008. http:/lblog.cleveland
08/06/cu .com/metro/
20
yahoga_county_ foreclosures
8.html.
163/d.

104COMM UNITY RESEARCH PA RTNERS,

£60 MILLION AND COUNTING: THE COST OF VACANT
AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO EIGHT OHIO CiTIES (2008), http://www.community
researchpartners.org/uploads/publications//FuliReport_Nonembargoed.pdf.
165

See Simon, supra note 1.31.

l ~>~>sw Lcs Christie. Foreclosure Focus: Why Cleveland'. CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 14,
2007, hitp://money.cnn.com/2007/ 11/ 12/re
al_
estate/Cleveland _foreclosure_ factors.
167

David Herszenhom, Bailoul Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, THE NF.w
Oct. 3. 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/I0/04/business/ economy/04bailout.
html?parmcr=pem1alink&; Press Release. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Preston Allocates Nearly $4 Billion to Stabilize N·eighborhoods in States and
YORK TIMES,
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resources like the Neighborhood Stabilization Funds are helpful, but the $25 million
earmarked for the City of Cleveland does little to address the magnitude of
168
Cleveland's vacant property challenge, produced by the foreclosure crisis.
The
most recent plan proposed by the city for the funds is to demolish 1700 vacant homes
and support other investments like community gardens and rental housing. 169 These
are good goals, but given the limited resources provided by the federal government,
Cuyahoga County had roughly 14,000
these efforts will not be sufticient.
foreclosures in 2007 alone, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development estimated more than 23,000 vacant residential addresses were in the
City of Cleveland in June of 2008. 17 Foreclosure prevention and mediation through
"work outs" are viable strategies, and several non-profits in the region have been
leaders in helping promote work outs. 171 However, national and state public
programs to support this work are limited in scope and too little pressure has been
applied to lenders to work out loans in lieu of foreclosure. 172 The institutional and
policy arrangements that led to the conditions in Cleveland and other segregated
markets are cumulative, interactive and historical. As stated earlier, the initial
red lining of these communities started in the 1930s, '40s, and ' 50s. 173 This lack of
appropriate credit led to a deteriorating neighborhood in a city with a declining tax
base for essential services, including schools. With the explosion of credit,
securitization and the push for new markets, these communities became the focus of
poor lending, including inappropriate sub-prime and predatory products. To stem the
tide of foreclosure is a critical intervention but isn' t enough- this would sti ll leave
these communities marginalized by the larger credit system. Thus solutions must
look beyond just stemming foreclosure and embrace measures to bring sustainable

°

Local Communities Hard-Hit by Foreclosure (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.hud.gov/oflicesl
cpcVcommunitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/.
68

Press Release, Cleveland City Council, Another Step Taken Toward Breaking the Cycle
of Abandonment (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/Newsl
February42009/tabid/619/ Default.aspx.
'

169

Henry J. Gomez, Mayor Frank Jackson Wams Federal Funds Usedfor Demolishing
Abandoned Homes, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 27, 2009, http://blog.cleveland.com/
metro/2009/0 1/mayor_ frank jackson_wants_ fede.html.
170

Gabriel Baird, Ohio Foreclosures Hit a Record; Northeast Ohio Sees Some Declines.
THE PLAfN DEALER,
Feb.
12. 2009, http:/lblog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/02/
ohio_foreclosures_hit_a_record.html: see also HUD, Neighborhood Stabilization database,
http://www.huduser.org/DATASETS/nsp_ foreclosure _data.html.
17 1

A foreclosure "work out" involves resuming payments and arranging to pay past due
payments over a short period of time, sometimes involving a modification of the mortgage.
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Office of Consumer Affairs, Foreclosure Prevention "Work Ou1
Resolutions, .. http://www.com.state.oh.us/dfi/pub/cons_ foreclworkout.pdf (last visited Apr.
I I, 2009).
172

Dina El Boghdady, HUD ChiifCalls Aid on Mortgage A Failure, THE WASH. POST.
Dec.
17,
2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 12/ 16/
AR2008121603 l77.html; Patrick Mitchell, Data: Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Fixes
Failing to Work, FORBES, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/ pmewswire/feedsl
prnewswire/2008/ 12/ 18/pmewswire20081218 1400PR_NEWS_ USPR _ _ DC53586.html.
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See SQUIRES, supra note 81.
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credit back to these neighborhoods. This entire process which marginalizes these
communities is deeply racialized without there being a need for conscious racial
animus.
The expanding recession in Ohio and Not1heast Ohio is placing further financial
strain on housing stability. The state of Ohio recorded more than 80,000 foreclosure
filings in 2007, and another 291,000 toreclosures are projected over the next four
years. m An estimated 420,000 Ohio homeowners are now "underwater" or have
negative equity, due to loan terms and declining property values. 175 These challenges
will continllle to grow for Cleveland, Northeast Ohio, and the State until significant
state and federal reforms stem the crisis. These ongoing challenges also speak to the
need to not only stem the foreclosure crisis, but to strategically intervene in hard hit
neighborhoods littered with vacant properties. We also need to reform or strengthen
fair housing throughout the state, to prevent the next housing crisis and assure that
sustainable credit becomes available for all Ohioans, inc luding our most
marginalized communities.

IV.

MOVING FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY:
N GTRANSFORMATIONAL THINKI

The dire fair housing challenges described in this article present a serious
problem for social justice advocates and for our nation. Housing and fair credit
provide more than just shelter and resources in our society; housing and credit are
transformational vehicles which can be critical pathways or bridges to opportunity. m
Fair housing provides the best mechanism to produce true integration into
communities of opportunity. 177
Access to good schools, stable and safe
neighborhoods, productive employment opportunities and strong professional and
social networks is dependent on living in or near neighborhoods which contain these
assets. Therefore, civil rights advocates have rightly focused great attention o n fair
housing, the "last plank" of the civil rights movement as the "structural linchpin" of
inequality, the critical intervention point to produce a more just and racially
equitable society . 178
Sustainable credit also is a transfom1ative intervention, opening a number of
opportunities such as wealth building or aJiowing investments in education or

"'The Center tor Rcspon s ibl~ Lending. Projet:ted Foreclosures by State,
http:i/www.rcsponsiblelcnding.org.lissues/mortgage/ quick-relerences/projected-toreclosureshy-state.html (13st visited Apr. II. 200()).
17

1 5
; Jonathan Stempel. One in Five Homeowners with Mortgages Underwater, REUTERS,
Oct.3 1, 2008, http://www.rcuters.cum/article/gc03/idUSTRE49S3Q520081 031; Paul Jackson,
7. 6 Million
(ller
e
Borrowers Und r.,..:
011 Mortgages: Study, HOUSINGWtR
E.C
OM, Oct. 3 1, 2008.
http://www. housi ngwi re.com/2008/ I0/3 1176-mi II ion-borrowers-underwater-on-mortgagesstudy.

116

See powell, mpra note 102. at \ 8<J.

117

See id.

17

~0LJV ER & SIIAPIRO, supra note 136 (referring to Lawrence Bobo. Keeping !he Linchpin
in Place: Testing the Multiple Sources of' Opposition to Residential Integration, 2 REVUE
INTERNATIONAL£ D E IF
PSYC!H
C)L
OC
SO IAL£: 305 , 307 ( 1989)); SHERYL D. CASHIN, THE.
fAILURES OF ( 1TEGR
A :TI01'< Ho w RACF AND CLASS ARE UNDERMIN ING IHE AMERICAN 0REt\M
J (2004) ("Housing
last was the
plank in the civil rights revolution, and it is the realm in
which we have experienced the fewest integration gains.").
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traillmg. Sustainable credit can a llow families to survive economic dislocation and
provide a bridge to new opportunities, like a college education or a home in an
opportunity-rich neighborhood. Because of the significance of both fair housing and
sustainable credit, we must continue to push foT the implementation of a true
transfonnative vision of fa ir housing for our nation. We must not be discouraged by
the new challenges created by the current housing and credit crisis; we must instead
utilize this window of opportunity to advocate and implement a transformative vision
of fair housing. The following section of this article closes by looking at the
weaknesses of our current methods of promoting fair housing through the 1968 Fair
Housing Act. We recommend a number of strategies and principles to guide tair
housing if we are going to achieve the goal of integrated communities of
opportunity, fair housing for all, and a just sustainable society.

A. A Review ofthe FHA: Challenges
One of the primary limitations of the Fair Housing Act is that it is a tort
approach, which relies too heavily on proving individual claims. 17Y The Act's
enforcement by the Department of Justice is also underwhelming. The Departmc:nt

of Justice pursues only hundreds of cases a year, a severe deficiency considering that
the Department of Housing and Urban Development estimates nearly two million
acts of housing discrimination occur each year. 180 However, scholars have drawn
attention to the fact that the Act requires the federa l government to affirmatively
further fair housing. 181 T he 1968 Civil Rights Act has two "affirmatively further"
provisions: § 3608(e)(5) requires the Secretary of HUD to "administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the policies of this title." 182 Section 3608(d) notes that other federal
departments and agencies have the same obligation. 183 Wagman writes that in the
Supreme Court case Trajjicante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Com1
refers to the purpose of the legislation. which was to "foster integration and counter
4
discrimination." 1 ~ In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Boston Chapter v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Judge Breyer emphasized that Title VIJI addressed segregation as well as
179

Brian Patrick Larkin, The Forty-Year "'First Step"': The Fair Housing Act ns an
Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, I 07 COLUM . L. REV. 1617, 1647 l2007); John
Boger. Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next
Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1553, 1584 (1992-1993). For a review of the proof standard.
see also John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing the Black Poor, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE RF.V . 605 , 620,
646 ( 1984) and Florence Roisman & Philip Tegeler, improving and Expanding Housi11g
Opportunity for Poor People ofColor, 24 CLEARI NGHOUSE REV.3 12, 315- I 6 ( 1990).
180

powell, suprcr note I 02, at 6 I 6.

'~' Florence Wagman Roisman, A Place to Culls Home?
ordabh·
.
A[f
Housing
America, 42 WAKE FOR EST L. REV. 333, 353 (2007).

l.1 we ill

182

The Civil Rights Act of I 968, U.S.C. § 3608 (1968), http://www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/html/uscodc42/usc_sec_ 42_00003608----000-.htmlllast visited Apr. 1 1, 2009}.
I Slid.

184

Roisman, supra note 181 , al 364; see generally Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 409 U.S. 284 ( 1976).
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discrimination. ll'' Despite these precedents, this important provision is critical and
has not bct:n interpreted in a broad enough manner to meet this goal.
B.

U~ing

Fair Housing w Prol'ide
e Tru Integration with

Opportuni~r

Another challenge" ith our current paradigm for thinking of fair housing is that it
docs not din:ctly focus enough energy on affimlativcly connecting marginalized
communities to opportunity. Racial integration is an important and critical goal, but
equally important is tme integration into opportunity. Our model of "opportunity
based housing'· interprets the primary goal of fair housing as providing tair housing
choices to all people in communities of opportunity. 1kr· To tmly meet the goals of
fair housing, we must turn out resources toward an opportunity oriented model of
housing and community development. We must strategically link efforts to build
and create opportunities in distressed areas, while allowing access to communities of
oppoltunity and other opportun ity structures to marginalized populations. This
model and approach means focusing on more than just assuring housing mobility,
but also assuring that sustainable and equitable community development improves
marginalized communities, and that marginalized communities have direct access to
critical opportunities like high performing schools. 1 ~
This new approach to fair housing also means retiring the old twentieth century
dichotomy of always relating the suburbs with opportunity. Opportunity is dynamic
and fluid in our metropolitan regions; many older, mature inner suburbs have
declined while some urban neighborhoods ha\'e rebounded. Moving people of color
indiscriminately to the suburbs does not guarantee they are moving into healthy,
stable communities of opportunity. Our efforts to link people of color to these
communities must respect this changing urban geography- this could mean
prioritizing moving to affluent suburbs and assuring aflordable housing in
maintained, redeveloping or gentrifYing communities.
7

C. Reinvigorating the Federal Role in the Huusing Market: Fannie. Freddie, and
the Future vf Fair I lousing

The federal government must play a significant role in addressing both this crisis
and aftirmatively tluthering fair housing in the future. The tederal government has
always played a role in our nation's housing market- U.S. government action in the
wake of th~ Depression built the foundation of homcowncrship and the American
middle class. Loca l actions arc critical. but must be ful ly supported by federal
resources and policy. Budget deficits arc already plaguing our State and local
budgets. and the philanthropic sector's assets have been impacted by the crisis on
Wall Street. Non-profits. many of which are funded by governments or foundations.
are dealing with resource shortages and increasing demands on their service. Local
governments. philanthropy. non-profits, and states do not have the resources to
address the systemic and widespr~ad challenges facing our nation.
~~~Ro isman , supra note 181. at 367.
1 6
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This resource mismatch is evident in Ohio. Consider that the State of Ohio's
total projected 201 0 general revenue expenditures were $29 billion, and that in 2006,
18
the top fifty philanthropic foundations giving in Ohio spent $350 million. ~ These
ligures are dwarfed by the size ofthe initial TARP legislation ($700 billion) and the
February 2008 stimulus package ($789 billion). 189 Prior to February of 2008, the
federal government's effort to solve the current crisns had been uncoordinated and
disconnected from the fair housing roots of the crisis. Too little attention had been
paid to the interrelated nature of vacancy and abandonment in our cities, the crisis on
Wall Street and the global credit market. Unfortunately, these issues continue to be
thought of as largely separate. So while there is a massive effort to stabilize banks
and other lending insnitutions, the federal rescue package is only weakly related to
the continuing forec losure crisis that is destabilizing housing markets, neighborhoods
and cities across the country. There are good reasons to believe that these
fragmented approaches will not work and that instead, a more deliberate effort to
address and Iink these efforts is required. 1'10
I. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Another opportunity tor a renewed federal role is the new status of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie were government chartered, publicly traded
companies before their historic takeover by the federal government in September
2008. 191 They are currently under "conservatorship"; Treasury Secretary Paulson
defetTed decisions regarding the mission of the companies for the next President and
Congress. 192 As newly emerging entities of the federal government, what are the
opportunities for holding Fannie and Freddie to the requirement of •·affirmatively
furthering fair housing" as mandated in 1968 Fair Housing Act? 193 As Fannie Mae
and Freddie hold about tive trillion dollars of housing mortgages (about 70% of all

tH~ For an overview of the projected biennial Ohio state budget. please see the Ohio Office
of Budget and Management's budget overview, Ohio Office of Budget and Management,
Budget, hup:J/obm.ohio.gov/sectionpages/Budget/FY IOJ 1/ExecutiveBudget.aspx (last visited
Apr. I I , 2009). For a listing of the largest philanthropic organizations giving in Ohio, see The
Foundation Center, Top 50 U.S. Foundations Award Grants in the State of Ohio, circa 2006,
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/pdf/03 fund geo/2006/50 found states/f oh
_06.pdf(last visited Apr. I I , 2009).
189

Neighborhood
Link, The 2009 Stimulus Package Explained, http://
www.neighborhoodlink.com/article/Communityffhe_2009 _Stimulus_Package_Explained
(last visited Apr. ll, 2009).
190

See
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R EPORT
THE E OF
ONTHE IMPACT
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STIMULUS PLAN
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(2009), http://4909e99d35cada6Je71757471 b724Jbe7Je5Jel4.gripelements.com/

publicntionslpreliminary_repon_on_stimulus_impacts_feb2009.pdf.
1 1

Q David
Ellis, US. Seizes Freddie and Fannie, CCNMONEY.C'OM, Sept. 7. 2008,
http://money. mn.com/2008
/ /
09 07 news/compan ies/fannie _freddie/index .htm'?post version=20
08090720.

193

Fair Housing Act supra note II, at Executive Order 12892.
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new home loans), these entities set much of the standard for the entire market. 1 ~ 4
Could the federal govemment proactively utilize Fannie and Freddie to meet the
goals of the Fair Housing Act?
What about the other financial institutions backed by federal bailout funds'?
From the emergence of the secondary market through the work of FHA, the federal
government historically has been instrumental in expanding housing opportunities
and developing our nation's middle class. but these efforts largely ignored or
marginalized communities of color. It is imperative that the concerns and interest of
communities of color not be ignored again. A deliberate effort needs to be made to
reset loans, to stabilize the market, to develop appropriate products, to extend
appropriate credit and to affirn1atively further fair housing. We believe these new
policy goals should be addressed together to support the opportunity based vision of
fair housing discussed above. 195
On February 18, 2009, President Obama unveiled a new plan to address the credit
and housing crisis. 196 His plan brings at least $75 billion in additional assistance to
encourage banks to work out loan terms (through financial incentives to financial
institutions) with delinquent borrowers. 197 The plan also dedicates investment into
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stabi lize both entities and aUows refinancing options
for "underwater" mortgage holders whose loans are currently held or backed by
these entities. 198 This enhanced tederal role is a good start but needs bolstering to
assure financial institutions cooperate, ideally through federal pressure on financial
institutions, especially institutions that receive federal T ARP funds. ln addition, this
new plan is just a start, and the federal government must begin to look toward the
long term needs of marginalized communities of color who have been locked out of
the prime credit market. The federal government must assure that sustainable cr;!dit
products are available to these communities and that federal resources are directed to
communities most traumatized by the dislocations and vacant properties created by
the crisis. The federal government must take this opportunity to use its newfound
leverage in the housing an.d credit market to produce true fair housing opportunities
for all communities.

D. The Future: How Do We Structure Fair Housing Policies to Reflect this New
Paradigm?
In designing fair housing initiatives and policies we must use new principles to
guide our thinking. A new era of systemic social justice challenges requires a new
approach and response, a new paradigm and way of thinking about our challenges.
We need to be targeted, outcome driven, tailor our policies and actions to situational
1 4

'~ Alan Ziebe1, Fannie. Freddie to Pay $294m in Bonuses, 9 NEWS, Apr. 4, 2009,
http:/174. 125.95. 132/search?q=cache:ZHSbZFXnLjwJ :news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx%3 Fi
d% 3D797550+F annie+Frcddie~·5+tri Ilion+ 70%25&cd= 1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl= us&client= fire

fox-a .
195

See POW ELL, s11pra note 190.

1Q6 President

Barack Obama. Address on the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
(Feb. 18, 2009). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/l8/us/politics/18text-obama.html?_r= I .
197/d.
JQ~ /d.
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constraints. be systems oriented and multifaceted, and inclusive in process.
Universal strategies, policies and programs and "one size fits all'' solutions will not
address the complex dynamks impeding fair housing.
I. Be Systems Oriented and Multi-Faceted
The root of the housing and credit crisis is a systemic challenge which requires a
new method of analysis and calls for different types of solutions. Our traditional
"'Newtonian" perspective on causation utilized a simple linear model of determining
causes and identifying solutions. 1y q A systemic approach to understanding causation
moves away from this linear approach, recognizing that causation is impacted by
multiple tactors or represents a system of interactions among various factors.
C ausation is reciprocal , mutual, and cumulative. In understanding the fair housing
problems created by the housing and credit crisis, these dynamics become quite
clear. The crisis in communities of color was not just the result of one factor but the
result of multiple factors, involving borrowers, neighborhoods, lenders, the financial
markets and others. These factors reinforced each other and worked together to
produce disparate outcomes in communities of color. As Jeffrey Sachs notes in The
End f?/ Poverty, "economies are complex systems." Sach's calls systems thinking
''clinical economics."200
To adequately intervene in these complex systems, we must fully understand
them and design our responses with c lear recognition of the systems' complex
interactions. Our solutions should both provide comprehensive relief while looking
for strategic intervention points within the system which would have the greatest
i.mpact. In the case of the foreclosure crisis, too many responses have not taken this
''clinical" or systemic approach. For example, extensive efforts have been made to
prevent foreclosure through mediation or "work outs" but these strategies will only
be cftective in a broad way if other factors in the system cooperate. So. if servicers
are not coerced or mandated to be more involved in work outs or are nonresponsive
to homeowners seeking help, then public policy efforts to encourage work outs
among borrowers will not be an effective transformative strategy to end the crisis.
2. Targeted Universalism and Tailoring to Situational Constraints
Universal policies assume a universal nom1. This conception, in fact, often
retlects a particular in its design and implementation.
For example, Social
Security-o ften described as the quintessential universal policy- was universal only
insofar as the universal was an able-bodied white male working outside the bome. 201
En its early years, the elderly were excluded since they had not been in the work force
long enough to qualify. 20~ Under the cultural norms of the era, men were the primary
wage-earners, and women typically worked in the home. Unpaid household labor
a nd child rearing responsibilities are not counted toward Social Security earnings.
''''D.A . fRI·.EDMAN, LIN~.AR
STATISTIC
CAUSATION:
AL MODELS FOR
A
l2005 ). http://www.wiley.com/ legac y!wi leychi/eosbs/pdfslbsa598.pdf.
1

CRITICAL REVIEW

2

!lltlJeftrcy Sachs, Developme111 Ec.f.Jnomics as Clinical Economics, TH E GLOBALIST, July 5,
20t)5, hUp:/i
www.thcglobatist.com/StoryJd.aspx?Story1d=4602.
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Even today, women \vho take time off to raise children or select careers with more
flc:xibk working hours will cam less. on average, then their male counterparts, and
''ill theretore have lower social security benefits upon retirement. And because of
exclusions of agricultural and domestic workers-exclusions built-in to appease
Southern resistance to the Act- sixty-five percent of African Americans were
initially denied its protections.~
Unfortunately, when based on a rigid particular (rather than reflecting the
different situations of people and communities)...universal" programs are as likely to
exacerbate inequality as to reduce it.l114 All communities and people are influenced
by a set of situational constraints. For marginalized communities and populations
these situational constraints can be severe and create a tremendous impediment to
oppottunity. For example, borrowers in communities of color were far more
vulnerable lo subprime mortgage brokers than the general population; they had a
number of situational constraints which enhanced their vu lnerability to predatory
lcnders. ~•Js
Factors such as redu<.:ed financial literacy, heightened economic
insecurity and community conditions created different vulnerabilities for these
populations. ~06 Meanwhile, the lending system changed with rapid growth in new
types of predatory loans and actors due to changes in the financial industry. 207
Our current protections to assure fair lending did not take all of these situational
constraints or dynamic changes in the mortgage market into account. Policies which
may have protected the majority population were very insufficient to protect
marginalized communities who are situated differently and more vulnerable. Our
policies and initiatives to promote Fair Housing must accept and be designed by
these situational constraints. Fair housing solutions and norms must be sensitive to
the hyper vulnerability of marginalized communities of color. The critical insight is
this: treating people who are situated differently as if they were equally able to
access the benefits of "universal" policies can in fact lead to greater inequities. In
the case of the foreclosure epidemic, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development neighborhood stabilization funds represent an intervention which must
be strategically targeted. Spreading neighborhood stabilization funds across all
neighborhoods would provide limited relief and probably no relief to neighborhoods
with the greatest concentrations of foreclosed properties.
The extreme concentrations of foreclosure in these communities have situated
them in a delicate situation, and in some cases are sending them spiraling into a state
of permanent distress. These communities require a different approach, and more
resources to arrest their fall. Some analysts feel that President Obama's new
foreclosure plalll (if it is successful) also represents a strategy which targets those
most impacted directly by the crisis (emphasizing individuals who currently cannot
make mortgage payments). 208 These types of targeted strategies will become more
01

20 '/d.
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important as the limited resources available to counter the crisis are used
strategically to have tlhe greatest impact.
We argue fo r moving beyond just simple targeted policies but also to look at a
third possibility. Universal and targeted approaches are false choices. There is a
third possibility, what we call "targeted universalism." This is an approach that
supports the needs of the particular while acknowledging that we are all part of the
same social fabriG. Targeting within universalism means being proactive and goal
oriented about ach ievable outcomes. As an initial step. an impact assessment could
be employed to gauge how a universal policy would impact particular groups. But
an impact assessment alone is not enough. In a complex, real world setting, policies
have unintended consequences and resistance that thwart policy intentions. It is
critical that targeted universal policies set clear goals and use mechanisms to closely
monitor and conect for negative feedback loops and other resistance.
3. Being Goal Oriented and Inclusive in Process
Systems are inherently dynamic and subject to change. For this reason, we
cannot allow our fair housing efforts be dominated by process but instead should be
goal tocused. In the case of the foreclosure crisis, we cannot allow ourselves the
luxury of expecting the dynamics producing the crisis to remain stagnant and
unchanging. Housing in particular is a very dynamic system; housing prices, interest
rates. credit and the economy all interact to influence the environment of the housing
market. This has direct implication to fair housing. When market conditions are hot,
policies such as inclusionary zoning would be a very successful strategy for
expanding affordable housing opportunities in opportunity rich areas. but when the
housing market cools, builders are not building as much new housing, and
inclusionary zoning suddenly becomes a less successful strategy. l f we were goal
oriented in this scenario, we would alter our policy approach to focus on other means
of providing affordable housing in those communities, such as targeting Section VJII
vouchers.
Simi lar unexpeGted dynamic changes have already occurred as a result of this
crisis. The tightened credit market has diminished the market value of the tax credit
and has substantially limited the eftectiveness of using Low Income Housing Tax
Credits to build affordable housing. 2n" The LIHTC program is the primary affordable
housing production program in our nation. m As producTion falls due to market
dynamics, we must adjust our strategies or we will face an even greater shortage of
affordable housing in the flllurc.
In the case of the foreclosure crisis, we must be prepared to change course if
system dynamics alter the tactors causing tort:closure. For example. traditional
assumptions an: that 11.mjus1 loan terms are the principle cause of foreclosure. 211 As a
result. many of our policy solutions are targeting modifying loan 1enns to resolve the
crisis. But, given the housing and credit crisis· impact on the economy and the
"''YThl' Low-I ncome Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC') program is run by the IRS and allows
companies to invest in low·income housing. while recei ving ten years of tax credits. A.
to Loll'·lncome Housing Tax Credits, R EALTOR .ORG,
Siudzins ki, Field Guide
http://www. rcaItor.org/1i brary/ Ii brary/tg 720.
~1\l.S't't!
l i
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recession, job losses or loss of income may become the primary factor causing
foreclosure in the near future. ln this scenario, policies and initiatives set up to alter
loan tenns would be insufficient to keep borrowers in their homes if most are
entering foreclosure due to income loss via joblessness. Thus, we must remain
flexible to change our strategies and approaches as the complexities of the system
change. By maintaining a goal-oriented approach to fair housing and staying away
from a process orientation, we can remain tlexible enough to adapt to these changing
conditions.
Finally, as we design new approaches to housing, credit, and fair housing in the
aftermath of this crisis, we must assure that marginalized commun ities, in particular
communities of color that are most impacted by the crisis, are at the table and
included in this redesign. We recommend creating a public/private commission that
would look at what it would take to affirmatively address both the housing and credit
needs of historically marginal communities. The goal should be not just to stem
foreclosures or even end intentional discriminattion, but to e liminate the dual housing
and credit market and its negative effects. This cannot be done one law suit at a
time. The Bush administration was sensitive to the need to affirmatively address the
disparities in the housing market; this sensitivity to this need should be applauded. 212
Unfortunately, the federal government's unregulated market approach did not
work. The Ford Foundation, under the leadlership of Melvin Oliver and Frank
DeGiovanni, also created a program to bring in more people or color and marginal
communities into the housing market, through the Community Advantage
Program. 213 This program was a relative success. It was not implemented to scale
and did not pay enough attention to the importance of place, but proves that
sustainable home ownership programs will work in marginalized communities. We
need to address these issues pragmatically, paying attention to changes in the market
and understanding what programs. policies and credit instrumc:nts work and are
sustainable.
As we remake the market and credit systems, we should be deliberate not to
continue the previous models which used the majority population as a model to
frame and design policies. Marginalized communit ies are differently situated and
require different credit instruments to be sustainable. We must embrace an approach
and process which is inclusive at all stages. where marginalized people and
communities have a direct voice in designing responses to t~1ir housing challenges.
l.n addition, there is a great need to develop, extend, and connect local community
development capacity.
In short, everyone should have an opportunity to give voice to the future of their
commumt1es. This includes supporting efforts to improve the participation of
marginalized groups in policy design, and improving data collection. monitoring and
evaluation of local, state and federal programs. Also. this means identifying and
lifting up or bringing to scale programs that are working to produce fair housing and
credit options in marginalized communities.214 We cannot design systemic reforms
that will produce fair credit, fair housing. and a just society without deliberately
212 Stevcn
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projet:ting the voice or marginalized communities made vulnerable by the current
s.
institutional arrangement
V. CONCLUSION

The world, our
market.
~.:redit
and our society continues to be dynamic and grows
increasingly more ected
interconn
every day. A number of complex global systems
have emerged in the new globa l et:onomy. these t:omplex systems requires a new
framework to underswnd our fair housing chalkngcs and to reach 1air housing goals.
This systemic era requires new ways of thinking, a new paradigm to identify the
causes, and ~ll lution s to inequity in our sodety. We must understand how systems
(like the glob<tl credit market) can produce disparate impacts in our neighborhoods
and communities. We must also understand how to identify sysuematic reforms to
address problems and seek critica l intervention points to produce transformative
change. As we look toward the future of fair housing, we should orient our work
around two clear goals. First. we must end the dual credit system, which has further
exploit
ed and marginalized communities of color. This provision also means
assuring that our response to ending the dual credit system does not exacerbate
ex isting challenges by instituting another era of redlining for marginalized
communities. We must assure that in the future, communities of color are brought
into and have full (and equal) participation in the credit market. We must implement
policies. cred it products. and tools which assure that communities of color are
prov ided sustainable credit options. Second. we must continue to work to create a
society where fair housing produces affordable housing in communities of
opportun ity. This opportunity based approach to tair housing must be the
fu ndamental premise guiding all of our tair housing and community development
ert<Hts. To have a just and susta inable nation and society, we must assure that fair
housing opportunity is avai lable to all.
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APPENDIX

Fig. I: Our housing market has gone from a two or three party system to a very
complicated system that very few people understand. Our laws, regulation and
oversight is based on the three party system. Source: two and three party system
graph created by the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity, multiparty
system figure created by Chris Peterson at the University of Utah. Figure adapted
from presentation delivered at the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity
National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and Race October 2-3, 2008,
available at http://www. ki rwan institutc.orgievents/arch i ve/su bprimeconven ingl
agenda.php.
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